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Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 Yale L.J. 544 (2019).
Innovation policy-a relatively new phrase for an old set of top-down competitiveness approaches (e.g. "industrial
policy," "science policy," "research policy," and "technology policy")-is necessarily a combination of centralized
investment, structure of private-sector incentives, and public policy priorities.This combination has always been
unwieldy, multivariate, and politically charged. As a result, constituencies favoring one or other approaches (e.g. longer
patent protection, more funding of public universities and research infrastructure, tariff or non-tariff import measures)
have lacked a unifying framework through which to analyze shared problems.
In Innovation Policy Pluralism, Daniel J. Hemel and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette provide that framework. With a focus on
intellectual property law, Hemel and Ouellette take the universe of innovation instruments-patents, prizes, grants, tax
credits, purchase leverage, public licensing and other alternatives-and create a coherent method by which to assess
and value them. Dissecting these options into "innovation incentives" and "allocation mechanisms," Hemel and
Ouellette urge policy-makers to consider alternatives under which these incentives and mechanisms may be matched,
mixed, or layered.
Their contribution is one I like a lot, and it will certainly shape important debates among intellectual property scholars in
the U.S.; for readers of JOTWELL International and Comparative, it is Hemel's and Ouellette's extension of their
argument to international intellectual property law that may be of most interest. They argue the following: first, their
framework may assist countries in better tailoring their innovation policies within prevailing international intellectual
property instruments; and second, international intellectual property law itself plays a regulatory role, ensuring that
some countries do not free-ride on the innovation of others.
According to them, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-often taken
as the world's international IP law-may be made more flexible more easily through the framework they construct. For
example, "a country could provide incentives [to innovate] though grants and prizes conditioned on relinquishing IP
rights... [o]r countries can both subsidize the domestic production of knowledge goods through grants and tax credits
and purchase domestic patent rights from the producer, while still allowing the producer to collect overseas profits (with
the state potentially collecting some of those profits through a tax on the domestic producer)." (P. 590.)
With respect to their second point, Hemel and Ouellette argue that international IP law (again, impliedly TRIPS) exists
to ensure that there is a global set of incentives so that all countries either invest in innovation or compensate those
who do. So far as it goes, Hemel and Ouellette are probably correct, but as they no doubt also know, the proliferation
of so-called TRIPS-plus agreements, which often invade deeply into the policv-settina prerogatives of sovereign states,
may limit the capacity of resource-poor countries to shape their innovation policies as freely as the authors imply.
To be sure, Hemel and Ouellete contemplate the possibility of cost-sharing outside of international IP law, and there
are plenty of examples under way like the World Health Organization's Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framewok
and a contemplated biomedical research and innovation treaty committed to non-IP incentives for research into Typell
and Type III diseases. In a separate work, I have argued that such cost-sharing vehicles proliferate as international
intellectual property law further constricts national-level regulatory prerogatives, especially those affecting basic human
needs.
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Innovation Policy Pluralism is a valuable contribution not only to the intellectual property literature, where it might
naturally nest, but also to scholars of international law and international relations. The authors clearly have some
"TRIPS flexibilities" in mind, and my expectation is that Hemel and Ouellette will use their framework to tackle some of
the most important problems facing countries that feel whipsawed by the needs of their domestic populations and the
strictures of international intellectual property law.
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